Shortly after the Japs struck at Pearl Harbor, thoughts of all military commanders turned to how
to get at the enemy both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. We could never win the war on the
defensive. We must take up the offensive. In both the major theaters it would be necessary to
cross extensive stretches of water to get at the enemy. Of course it would be the mission of the
Navy to carry the Army safely through submarine-infested waters to near the enemy shore. But
what about
getting from
ship
to
shore?
How could this be best done and who should control it?
Also what about
shore-to-shore
movements after the initial hold on the enemy shore was won?
The Japs in their rapid campaign in the Malay Peninsula which resulted in the surprisingly quick
fall of Singapore had only too effectively demonstrated early in 1942 the advantages of using the
water for shore-to-shore movements rather than the land through its roadless jungles and in the
face of a defender’s hot fire. It was much better to bypass such obstacles by water than to force
one’s way through them, to go around a defensive position rather than through it; to land
waterborne troops on beach after beach to outflank the enemy instead of making a costly
overland attack.
It was obvious that World War II would not only be an
air
war and a
mechanized
War but also
an
amphibious
War. The Army, the Navy, and the Marines had all given some thought to an
amphibious war. Small-scale maneuvers with very limited equipment had been held in Puerto
Rico and off the Carolina coasts. Thought had been given to converting boats so they could be
used for beach landings, but we all had to admit that in January 1942 the Japs were far ahead of
us not only in amphibious equipment but also in the tactics
of amphibious warfare. As a matter
of fact they were far ahead of the Germans, too. Had the Nazis been as far advanced in the field
of amphibious warfare in 1940 as the Japs were in 1941, Britain might well have been invaded
after France fell. Instead, the
German High Command admitted after the armistice that they had
no amphibious equipment ready for the invasion of Britain, when Belgium and France crumbled
sooner than expected.
With characteristic ingenuity the U.S. Navy quickly pushed the development of
special craft for
landings. Some types of British craft were copied but greatly improved. In early 1942, though,
the Navy felt it could not train a sufficient number of boatmen to meet the demands of a channel
invasion in Europe and the unknown but extensive amphibious operations bound to come in the
Pacific. When it was suggested that the Army train and man some of the landing craft to carry
soldiers from ship to shore, the plan fell upon fertile ground.
Colonel (later Major General) Daniel Noce was the pioneer who foresaw the need for Army
amphibian troops, not only operating small landing craft, but also doing the essential shore
engineering on the beaches. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, head of the Ground Forces,
and his Chief of Staff, Colonel (later General) Mark W. Clark, first had to be won over to the
important need for these new specialized types of troops. Some thought combat engineers could
become specialists in this new type of operations by simply taking some extra training. Colonel
Noce pointed out that combat engineers would always have their hands full with their own
duties, that highly trained amphibian specialists, knitted into well oiled teams, would be needed
to make successful landings.
