After the patrols came back, on that afternoon of June 8th, everything was quiet in Boos. Most of our men were
asleep, with only a few on duty at the antitank guns and machine guns. We saw several German planes during
the afternoon, but none of them attacked us. Around 3:00, an observation plane circled rat
her low over our
village. We did not move or fire, in order not to reveal our presence.
At 4:00 P.M., a French colonel presented himself to my captain. He showed a regular identification card and
said he had been sent from corps headquarters to tell us that at around 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. fourteen French tanks
would arrive on their way south to defend Rouen, and that we should not fire at them. The tanks could be
recognized by the fact that their turrets would be open and that white flags would be waved by the
crew of each
tank.
We had never seen this colonel before. It was very peculiar that corps headquarters had not sent us the message
by radio. And so at once we sent a message asking for confirmation. The officer in charge said he knew nothing
about it. In view of all this, my captain ordered me to have all men awakened and placed at their combat posts. I
sent messages warning the three armored cars on the outskirts of the village and likewise had the tank crews
prepared. Finally, I arranged to have a noncommissioned officer meet the commander of the tanks as soon as
they were sighted.
A little after 4:30, the 47
-
mm. antitank
-
gun crew at (1) reported by telephone that it had seen armored vehicles
in the distance along road G—the road to Puits Guerard on which
no armored car had been stationed. The other
AT guns, which had been connected with the command post by telephone were at once warned.
The tanks were now slowly approaching. With my field glasses I could see them in the distance with their
turrets open and
the white flags waving. I now ordered the noncommissioned officer to meet the commander of
the tanks. The noncom jumped on a solo motorcycle and rode out toward them. Just as he got about halfway out
to them from our antitank gun he suddenly turned on the
road and headed back at full speed. Obviously
something was wrong. Then, as suddenly, I saw the white flags disappear, the turrets close. The leading tank
opened fire at the noncom who fell from his motorcycle hit. They were unquestionably German tanks, and the
French officer had been nothing but a German spy or a fifth columnist.
Immediately my captain was informed of the situation. I stayed not far from the 47-mm. at (1), from which I
could have a good view of what was going on and inform my captain accordingly. I watched the tanks come
down the road toward us. They were German mediums (22 tons, with a 77-mm. antitank gun). There were just
14 tanks—no reconnaissance, no armored cars, no motorcycles. Maybe there was motorized infantry following,
but I could not see it. Recognizing the tanks as mediums, I immediately gave the order to send a message to the
armored cars to retreat at once into the village.
The captain had a message sent to corps headquarters to the effect that we were being attacked by 14 tanks
coming from Puits Guerard. The captain suggested that corps headquarters get in touch with the other Groupe
Franc by radio, for we had been out of touch with them, and ask whether the tanks of the other Groupe Franc
couldn’t come toward Boos and effect
a surprise attack from the south. The general did not like the idea of
sending the tanks of the other Groupe Franc so many miles to the north.
Apparently he was still thinking of World War I where eight to ten miles was a long distance, but in this war of
movement such a distance was negligible. Besides, the use of tanks in small numbers, easily destroyed
piecemeal by the enemy, was typical of the attitude and tactics of many French staff officers.
My captain decided to cut red tape and send one liaison man
full speed to Igoville on a solo motorcycle to ask
the captain commanding the other Groupe Franc for support. We had apparently made a big mistake when we
had counted on a smooth radio liaison with the other Groupe Franc through corps headquarters. We should have
established direct radio contact ourselves.
When the first German tank came close enough, approximately 800 yards, the 47-mm. antitank-gun crew
opened fire. At this position I had placed the crew I considered most efficient, because antitank gun (1) was the
most important spot in our defense. This crew really knew how to fire. In two shots it hit the first German tank
in the column and put it out of action. The shell seemed to have gone through the tank like butter. But our
feeling of complacency over this did not last long. The second tank was shooting high-explosive shell against
the edges of the village. One of the shells fell not very far away. The 47-mm. antitank-gun crew, however,
opened fire again and got this second tank. The German column t
hen hesitated a little. I crawled to the
telephone and reported to my captain, who told me that he was sending the tanks out now to counterattack, and
for the antitank-gun crew to take care not to shoot at them.
